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THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE DIS-
COURSES OF CONQUEST. By Robert A. Williams, Jr. New York: Ox-
ford University Press. 1990. Pp. xi, 352. $39.95. 
On October 12, 1992, many people in Western nations will cele-
brate the quincentenary of Columbus' voyage to the New World. The 
U.S. Congress has established a Quincentenary Jubilee Commission,1 
and the United Nations, in its 1982 session, considered a proposal to 
designate 1992 as the "Year of the Fifth Centennial of the Discovery 
of America."2 Schoolchildren across the United States are taught that 
"In Fourteen Ninety-Two, Columbus sailed the ocean blue," seeking 
to find a western route to Asia. Instead, he discovered the land groups 
that would soon be dubbed "the New World." 
On October 12, 1992, many of the Indians of the Americas will 
mourn the beginning of "five centuries of heartbreak."3 Indians lob-
bied the United Nations to have 1992 declared "The Year of the 
World's Indigenous Peoples" and October 12 declared "The Day of 
Mourning and Solidarity with the Indians of the Americas."4 To Na-
tive Americans, Columbus is not a hero; instead, he is "the first great 
slavemaster sent by the Old World to the New World."5 
The Western colonization of the Americas resulted in many 
deplorable events, including broken promises, enslavement, and forced 
relocation. History classes may teach some of what happened, but 
rarely do they delve into the justifications supporting why it happened. 
Professor Williams' book attempts to fill this gap by examining the 
legal discourses of conquest advanced by countries to rationalize their 
treatment of indigenous peoples. The book is unique in the field of 
federal Indian law. Most works in this area begin with the early, foun-
dational Supreme Court cases. The American Indian in Western Legal 
Thought, however, ends with the first of these foundational cases. 
Rather than show us how law developed from these principles, Wil-
liams illustrates how these principles developed. To achieve this task, 
Williams selects writings from Spain, England, and the United States, 
because these countries had the greatest impact on the Indians, and he 
focuses primarily on the early periods of contact, because it was in 
1. Act to Establish the Christopher Columbus Quincentenary Jubilee Commission, Pub. L. 
No. 98-375, 98 Stat. 1257 (1984). 
2. G.A. Res. L.36, 37 U.N. GAOR (83d plen. mtg.) at 1371, U.N. Doc. A/37/L.36 (1982). 
3. Joy Harjo, Creek Indian and acclaimed poet, quoted in Dunbar-Ortiz, Christopher Colum-
bus and "The Stink Hiding the Sun," Crossroads, Oct. 1990, at 16, 18. 
4. Dunbar-Ortiz, supra note 3, at 16-17. 
5. P. 83. As governor of Hispaniola, Columbus sent Indians back to Spain as slaves and 
instituted a system of forced labor on the island. Pp. 82-83. 
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these early stages that "the legal rights and status of the American 
Indian were most vigorously debated and contested" (p. 7). 
Williams uses a legal history format to explore the development of 
Native American legal status. Each part of the book intertwines the 
historical facts of discovery and conquest with the major arguments 
advanced at the time to justify this discovery and conquest. Williams 
culls these arguments mainly from the sources widely cited in each 
time period, such as lectures, sermons, essays, treatises, proclamations, 
and other types of spoken or written material. 6 His purpose in writing 
the book is to show how this discourse changed and developed over 
time (p. 7). The book paints an embarrassing picture of narrow-
minded beliefs and single-minded determination by Europeans and 
Americans to pursue commercial opportunities. 
Part I of the book explores the development of papal discourse 
supporting the crusades, and the adaptation of this discourse by Spain 
to support its New World ventures. In Part II, Williams examines 
Protestant translations of these medieval and Renaissance ideas, look-
ing specifically at· the evolution of colonizing discourse in England. 
Finally, Part III investigates the versions of these discourses present in 
the early United States, conduding with the Supreme Court case 
Johnson v. M'Intosh, 7 which adopted the doctrine of discovery8 as law 
in the United States. 
As Part I reveals, early canon lawyers argued that the non-Chris-
tian beliefs of "infidels" deprived these persons of the right to possess 
land (p. 45). Later, after the introduction of Roman legal ideas and 
Aristotelian arguments, the discourse was modified to admit that infi-
dels did have natural law rights to own land, but that these rights were 
qualified by the papal right to intervene for the protection of the infi-
dels' spiritual well-being. Subsequently, Catholic princes and kings 
manipulated these rights to allow for exploration and conquest of 
lands newly cliscovered by the Europeans (p. 67). 
Willia:µis has structured this first Part well, exposing in a logical 
fashio~ each progression in the chain of reasoning and clearly illustrat-
ing how historical events related to and affected these changes. Wil-
liams moves the reader from fifth-century papal rhetoric and activity 
through the work of Franciscus de Victoria in the early sixteenth cen-
tury, showing at each tum how the present built upon or altered the 
past. 
One striking feature of European culture illustrated by this Part, 
and to a lesser degree by Parts II and III, is the Europeans' belief that 
6. Williams, and consequently this book notice, use the word "discourse" to encompass all of 
these materials. 
7. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). 
8. This doctrine declares that title to land passes to the discovering nation, and that the 
native peoples only have a right of occupancy. Pp. 315-16. 
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only Eurocentric ideals, practices, and religions are correct. This be-
lief underlies almost all medieval and Renaissance discourses of con-
quest. The Indians were different, and therefore to the European 
mind, in error. The conquerors believed it was their duty to show the 
natives the error of their ways. None of the discourses mentioned by 
Williams considers the possibility that European norms are not the 
only yardstick with which to measure degrees of civilization. 
Part II begins with the early sixteenth century and the English 
Reformation. Less organized than Part I, this section devotes a 
slightly disproportionate amount of space to a summary of historical 
events. This excess of space occupied by the events results in less dis-
cussion of colonizing discourse than was present in Part I. 
Williams may spend so much of his time relating the events them-
selves, rather than discussing the Europeans' justifications, for two 
reasons. First, much of the discourse that Williams presents in Part II 
consists simply of variations on the arguments previously elaborated. 
Second, much of sixteenth-century English international law depended 
on the individual sovereign, since England was no longer subject to the 
Pope and Parliament was still inferior in power to the monarch. As 
the actual and only ruler of the nation, the monarch possessed great 
control over foreign policy. 
Williams advances neither of these justifications in his book, but 
they probably explain his approach to some extent. The first justifica-
tion supports the lack of space allotted to discussion of the discourse. 
If the discourse was largely unchanged from that described in Part I, it 
required little additional discussion in Part II. The second rationale 
explains why a greater amount of time was spent reciting history. In-
creased emphasis on historical data is required if these facts play a 
larger role in influencing the discourse. Williams does not clearly ex-
plain, however, the connections between all the facts he presents and 
the changes in the discourse. 
Part III spans only sixty years, beginning in 1763 and the start of 
the Revolutionary era in America and concluding with Chief Justice 
John Marshall's 1823 opinion in Johnson v. M'lntosh. 9 Williams uses 
Part III to focus on the conflicting views of Indian land rights present 
in the early United States. The origins of one view, the notion that 
Indians did not possess the right to dispose of land as they chose, trace 
back to the discourses discussed in Part I (p. 287). In contrast, a sec-
ond view, partially a result of widespread speculation in Indian lands, 
held that Indians did possess the natural law right to control the dis-
position of their land without validation by any W estem government 
(p. 287). Unfortunately for the Indians, the former view eventually 
prevailed in a political compromise reached by Congress.10 
9. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). 
10. Virginia was the primary advocate of the first view, because its claims to large amounts of 
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This compromise would later indirectly influence the outcome of 
Johnson v. M'Intosh (p. 316). Johnson involved a dispute among 
whites over proper title to certain land. The plaintiff land company 
traced its title back to Indians, whereas the defendant's title derived 
from the federal government. The defendant prevailed because the 
Supreme Court adopted the doctrine of discovery, ruling that Indians 
were not able to pass legal title to land. Johnson was the first of three 
decisions11 written by Chief Justice John Marshall that defined the 
fundamental relationship between Native American tribes and the fed-
eral government, thereby establishing the foundation for modem 
American Indian law.12 
In his book, Williams does not attempt to present a detailed ac-
count of the time periods or thoroughly analyze all the nuances of the 
debates. Such a task would require far more space than the confines of 
the book allow. In fact, Williams' book raises almost as many, if not 
more, questions as it answers. The American Indian in Western Legal 
Thought, however, is a highly readable, thought-provoking work that 
provides an excellent overview of the issues and major historical argu-
ments in this field. It is definitely a must read for anyone interested in 
this subject. 
- Melissa L. Koehn 
land derived from a government charter, and the state argued vociferously for Congress to nullify 
the land purchases of speculators. The dispute continued until late 1783, when 
a political compromise satisfactory to the Virginians and to Congress (but certainly not to 
the Indians or to the speculators) was finally brokered. Congress would accept Virginia's 
cession of its claims north of the Ohio, but it would not specifically invalidate all private 
land purchases from the natives in the territories, as originally demanded by Virginia. Con· 
gress however, agreed not to investigate the question of conflicting claims in the region. 
Given this agreement and the additional promise by Congress that the lands should be used 
for the common benefit of the states, the Virginians were satisfied that their cession did not 
require a provision against private purchases from Indians ..•• Congress had essentially 
acceded to Virginia's demands .... 
In 1784, Congress formally accepted the Old Northwest cession from Virginia, thus ef· 
fectively closing the door on the land-speculating companies. 
Pp. 305-06. 
II. The other two decisions are Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831), and 
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). 
12. F. CoHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 232-35 (1982); V. DELORIA & C. 
LYTLE, AMERICAN INDIANS, AMERICAN JurncE 26-33 (1983). 
